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梯若尔:市场力量与监管     ★★★ 【字体:
梯若尔:市场力量与监管
作者:佚名    文章来源:诺贝尔官网、搜狐财经、互动百科    点击数:1462    更新时间:2014-11-28

梯若尔:市场力量与监管
 

编者语:2014年诺贝尔经济学奖揭晓,法国经济学家梯若尔荣膺桂冠。诺奖委员会认为,梯若尔的理论为垄断管制研究注入了新的生命力,是驯服垄断寡头公司的利器。他向人们阐明了如何理解并监管由数家寡头公司垄断的行业。本期给读者带来的是诺奖委员会对梯若尔获奖的点评,在文中,委员会对梯若尔的学术成就进行了回顾,认为他为产业经济学创造了一个统一的理论和监管框架,他不但发展了经济学分析的一般理论框架,还将它们应用于特定的环境和完全不同的行业,为经济学的发展做出了巨大的贡献。

 

/the Economic Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences

To what extent should the government intervene in the marketplace-Economists often consider ercely competitive markets to be in the public interest. When producers in such markets strive to earn a prot,they are led as if by an invisible hand to deliver high quality at low cost. But many industries are not very competitive,and this lack of competition widens the scope for benecial public intervention.Theories of regulation and competition policy aim to provide useful scientic guidance for such intervention.Clearly,any recommendations must rest on a sound understanding of how imperfectly competitive markets work.When a rm has market power,how will it behave?How does its behavior affect the rms suppliers,customers,and competitors?Questions like these are studied within the eld of Industrial Organization (IO).George Stigler was awarded the 1982 Prize in Economic Sciences for his seminal studies of industrial structures,functioning of markets and causes and effects of public regulation.Since then,however,the IO eld has undergone rapid development,indeed a revolution.This revolution has greatly enhanced our understanding of imperfectly competitive markets,which in turn has laid a foundation for better informed competition policy.Comparable progress has been made in the theory of optimal regulation of rms with market power.The progress in these areas largely reects two methodological breakthroughs:game theory and the theory of mechanism design.By the end of the 1970s,the time was ripe for applying these tools to the major issues of imperfect competition,regulation,and competition policy.Over the next decade,many economists were drawn into these fertile elds.The analytical revolution was to a large extent a collective effort but,among many contributors,Jean Tirole stands out.No other scholar has done more to enhance our understanding of IO in general,and of optimal policy interventions in particular.The theoretical advancements coincided with a period of great public-policy interest in the same issues.During the 1980s and 1990s, many countries pursued regulatory reforms and pro-competitive liberalization sometimes in conjunction with privatizations.The European Union created the single market.Many new issues arose that could not be fruitfully studied with the help of existing theory their analysis required a combination of oligopoly theory and contract (principal-agent) theory and an integration of industrial economics with public economics.Tiroles expertise spans all these elds, and he was thus ideally positioned to make a lasting contribution.

Before discussing the specifics,let us emphasize that Tiroles overall scientific contribution is greater than the sum of his individual contributions.He has created a unified framework for IO theory and regulation, founded on a rigorous analysis of strategic behavior and information economics.It is hard to do justice to his immense body of work in a few introductory paragraphs,but a few features of his research do loom large.First,Tirole has established a new standard of rigor in the fields of IO and regulation.He has consistently derived his results from fundamental assumptions about preferences,technologies (including contracting technologies) and information asymmetries,eschewing the convenient but ad hoc assumptions that had previously seemed necessary in order to make analytical headway.From the outset,Tiroles approach has required unusual technical expertise,especially in the rapidly evolving fields of game theory and contracttheory.While this years prize emphasizes Tiroles creative application of these analytical tools to regulation and IO theory, it is noteworthy that Tirole also made significant contributions to the toolbox itself (see Section 6).

Second,Tiroles rigor has facilitated realism.Division of labor in the scientific community frequently encourages theorists to specialize in understanding the inner logic ofnew models,leaving the challenging job of confronting the models with reality to moreapplied scientists.As a result,theoretical work sometimes seems detached fromthe realworldandrelevant practice.By contrast,Tirole has carefully designed his models to capture essential features of specific economic environments,and to highlight importantmechanisms that previous applied research had either ignored or failed to articulate withsufficient precision.

Third,Tirole has brought order to an unwieldy literature.By deploying a consistent conceptual framework over a wide range of issues,he became a leader in the creation of the first encompassing and coherent theory of IO.After more than 25 years,his groundbreaking 1988 textbook remains the best road-map to the field.If the book is becoming outdated in a few areas,this is largely due to Tiroles own subsequent work and the work he has inspired.Tiroles 1993 book,co-authored with Jean-Jacques Laffont,presented a unified framework which has deeply influenced how economists think about regulation.

Fourth,Tiroles models have sharpened policy analysis.Focusing on the fundamental features that generate a divergence between private and public interests,Tirole has managed to characterize the optimal regulation of specific industries.Often,his rigorous thinking has overturned previous conventional wisdom.For example,he successfully challenged the once prevalent view that monopoly power in one market cannot be profitably leveraged into another market by vertical integration.As a result,competition authorities have become more alert to the potential dangers posed by vertical integration and restraints.More generally,Tirole has shown how the justifications for public intervention frequently boil down to problems of information asymmetries and credible commitments.These general lessons together with a catalogue of specific applications form a robust foundation for policy analysis.

In this document,we briefly summarize Tiroles most important contributions to the theory of IO and the regulation of dominant firms.We start in Section 2 with his seminal work on the public regulation of a natural monopoly, most of which reflects a long-standing collaboration with Jean-Jacques Laffont.This work was mostly published in the period 1986 to 2001 and is summarized in Laffont and Tiroles encyclopedic 1993 book.It builds a coherent foundation for regulation theory,replacing ad hoc assumptions with explicit contracting frictions (such as asymmetric information and limited commitment).Many insights are quite general and apply to most regulatory settings,as well as to the related topic of government procurement.Among the most significant advances are the modelling of regulatory capture (collusion between regulatory agencies and regulated firms) and dynamic contracting.These advances were inspired by fundamental contributions to contract theory: Tirole (1986a), Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) and Hart and Tirole (1988).The importance of these contributions extends far beyond regulation and procurement.

Although general theories can be of great value,in the end all regulation must be industry-specific.This point is illustrated by example in Laffont and Tirole (2000),where they consider the regulation of the telecommunications industry,as well as in Tiroles studies of other industries,ranging from banking to electricity. The research on the regulation of specific industries illustrates Tiroles exceptional ability to grasp the central features of an economic environment,to formulate these features mathematically,to analyze the resulting model,and to produce normative conclusions of great practical significance.

Although the motivation for the prize focuses on normative theories of optimal regulation and competition policy,any normative theory must rest on a positive analysis of how firms interact.For competition and regulation policy,it is especially important to understand interaction in imperfectly competitive markets.Therefore,oligopoly theory is the most central topic in IO.Jean Tirole played a major role in the transformation of oligopoly theory during the 1980s.Among his many contributions to this field,we emphasize his work on strategic investments and R&D races (with Drew Fudenberg and others),on dynamic oligopoly (with 2007 Economics Laureate Eric Maskin),and on co-marketing (with Josh Lerner).These contributions are discussed in Section 3.

Section 4 discusses how theoretical advances have changed the way economists think about competition policy.In particular,Tirole has convincingly analyzed public policies regarding vertical contractual relationships. Vertical relationships only require regulation if they impose costs on outsiders that are greater than the benefits to insiders.Thus,a vital element of the analysis is a precise understanding of mutually beneficial contracts between sellers and buyers in a vertical chain a problem which closely resembles that of optimal regulation of monopolies (discussed in Section 2).Another important element is to understand the nature of strategic behavior towards competitors (discussed in Section 3).Tiroles analysis of vertical contractual relationships quickly gained academic acceptance, and it has contributed to a significant revision of competition policy, especially in the U.S.

As mentioned,Tirole has not only developed general theoretical frameworks of analysis,but also adapted them to the circumstances of specific and quite different industries.Section 5 discusses two such applications,namely to telecommunication and financial intermediation.

Finally,Section 6 briefly describes some of Tiroles many contributions to other topics: general economic theory,financial markets,asset-market bubbles,organization economics,corporate finance, and behavioral economics.

 

 

梯若尔个人简介

梯若尔是2014年诺贝尔经济学奖得主,被誉为当代天才经济学家。他那智慧的光芒和热量洒向经济学每一个研究领域。他具有非凡的概括与综合能力,总是能够把经济学的任何一个领域中最为本质的规律和最为重要的成果以最为简洁的经济学模型和语言表达出来,并整理成一个系统的理论框架。

梯若尔1953年出生在法国巴黎附近的一个小镇,1976年,他以优异的成绩毕业于素有法国科学家摇篮之称的法国理工学院。1978年,在获得巴黎第九大学应用数学博士学位后,他来到著名的美国麻省理工学院继续深造,并于1981年获得经济学博士学位。

梯若尔对经济学惊人的直觉,也是一般的经济学家望尘莫及的。这个瘦高身材的法国绅士,目光敏锐,衬衫的颜色永远高贵并跟外套和谐,脸上洋溢着不瘟不火的微笑,脑子里随时可以调出各种各样的经济学模型。

梯若尔具有非凡的概括与综合能力,他总是能够把经济学的任何一个领域中最为本质的规律和最为重要的成果以最为简洁的经济学模型和语言表达出来,并整理成一个系统的理论框架。

梯若尔仿佛专为经济学而生,被誉为当代天才经济学家。纵观其20多年学术生涯中所作出的贡献,足令任何经济学家瞠目:300多篇高水平论文,11部专著,智慧的光芒和热量洒向经济学每一个研究领域。

 

主要学术研究领域和贡献

新产业组织理论

产业组织理论是近年来经济学最活跃、成果最丰富的领域之一。产业组织理论以市场与企业为研究对象,从市场角度研究企业行为或从企业角度研究市场结构。

作为一种完整而系统的理论体系,产业组织理论的出现是与新古典的微观经济理论在解释垄断或不完全竞争问题上的失败分不开的,或者从实践看,产业组织是伴随20世纪以来大型制造业公司的迅猛涌现以后才出现的。产业组织理论引起了越来越多的世界一流理论经济学家们的注意和兴趣。他们不断地加入研究的行列。20世纪80年代前后,以梯若尔为代表的经济学家将博弈论和信息经济学的基本方法和分析框架引入产业组织理论的研究领域,对产业组织理论产生了革命性影响。

新产业组织理论的特点可以归纳为三个主要方面:从重视市场结构的研究转向重视市场行为的研究;突破了传统产业组织理论单向、静态的研究框架,建立了双向的、动态的研究框架;博弈论的引入,意味着对传统的由市场机制决定的瓦尔拉均衡可行性的怀疑,如现代大公司可通过许多非市场的制度安排,如合谋、内部整合、组织结构调整等来解决问题,而不依靠市场。

《博弈论》

1991出版之日起,梯若尔和弗登博格合著的《博弈论》便成为博弈论领域最具权威性的研究生教材,为美国各个高校经济学系的博士课程所采用。作为整个博弈理论中最为经典、与经济学中理性人假设最一脉相承、也是应用最为广泛的理论,非合作博弈是博弈理论中最为重要的部分。书中涵盖了非合作博弈的全部重要内容,不仅包括策略式博弈、纳什均衡、子博弈完美性、重复博弈以及不完全信息博弈等常规内容,而且还包括马尔可夫均衡这样的非常规内容。对世界著名大学研究生的博弈论教育产生了重要影响。时至21世纪初,它仍然是博弈论领域中最前沿的教科书之一。

新规制经济学

新规自20世纪80年代中期始,梯若尔和拉丰(Jean-JacquesLaffont)共同开创了激励理论的一个最新的应用领域———新规制经济学,并以两本经典著作《政府采购和规制中的激励理论》(1993)和《电信竞争》(2000)完成了该理论框架的构建,确立了其在该领域的开创者地位。

在批判传统规制理论的基础上,他们创建了一个关于激励性规制的一般框架,结合了公共经济学与产业组织理论的基本思想以及信息经济学与机制设计理论的基本方法,成功地解决了不对称信息下的规制问题。梯若尔和拉丰于1993年出版的著作《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》完成了新规制经济学理论框架的构建,并奠定了他们在这一领域的学术领导者地位。

梯若尔和拉丰将新规制经济学的基本思想和方法应用于垄断行业的规制问题,分析各种规制政策的激励效应,并建立了一个规范的评价体系。2000年,作为对十几年垄断行业规制理论与政策研究的总结,他和拉丰合著的《电信竞争》一书,为电信及网络产业的竞争与规制问题的分析和政策的制订提供了一个最为权威的理论依据。

梯若尔从当代经济学三个最前沿领域———博弈论、产业组织理论和激励理论的研究中,获知研究经济学的真谛:要有经济学家的直觉———即透过纷 繁复杂的经济现象把握经济学本质的能力,时刻讲求经济学研究的方法论。凭此,自1990年代中期始,梯若尔不断在经济学的各个新领域拓荒,硕果累累。

 

建模型解串谋难题

1992年,在国际经济计量学会第六届世界大会上,梯若尔提交论文《经济组织中的串谋问题》。串谋与勾结是所有的组织或机构中普遍存在的现象,早已为政治学家和社会学家所关注。串谋与勾结会给社会福利带来损失,因而如何在制度设计中解决串谋问题,一直成为政治家和学者们不懈努力的目标之一,并在人类的制度文化中占有重要地位。

然而这个重要现象长期以来却一直未能受到主流经济学家的重视。作为社会科学理论的皇冠明珠,主流经济学的理论与实践取得过令人瞩目的成就,但它在制度分析方面尤其是对于串谋现象的漠不关心和无所作为,无法令人满意。究其根源,仍然是主流经济学家对于新古典主义的完备市场假设这个教条的坚定信 念。

在产业组织理论和规制经济学等诸多领域,串谋现象造成了产业政策和政府规制政策的严重扭曲,这一点即使在司法体系十分完备的欧美国家都普遍存在(如美国的安然公司和世界电信与安达信公司合谋做假账等案件),更不用说许多处于制度转型时期的发展中国家。

梯若尔这篇综述性论文建立在他于1986年发表在《法、经济学与组织杂志》上的基本框架———多代理人模型上,它指出了研究串谋问题的重要性并提供了基本方法论。在该论文中,梯若尔提出了著名的防范串谋原理:为了避免串谋带来组织效率的损失,对于一般性组织,委托人总可以设计一组新的机制或契约,通过转移支付等手段,使得代理人的收益超过他参与串谋的收益,从而抵消了代理人参与串谋的积极性。

研究串谋问题的另一个理论上的困难,来自于代理人串谋时所达成的支契约的可执行性。在法律上,一般地,这种支契约是非法的,因而很难将其纳入到契约理论的框架中。

梯若尔则在非合作博弈的框架下,运用他所擅长的声誉模型和重复博弈模型很好地解决了这个难题。他指出,串谋往往发生在具有长期合作关系的组织中,这种长期关系使得代理人在串谋时更重视合作的声誉以及未来的收益,因而保证了串谋契约是自持的。

梯若尔这篇论文建立了串谋理论的基本框架,在这个框架基础上,图卢兹学派,尤其是拉丰和马赫蒂摩(Laffontand Martimort)所作的突出贡献使其成为完整的理论体系。

不完全契约理论

1999年,梯若尔在Econometrica发表了《不完全契约理论:我们究竟该站在什么立场上》。这篇论文被认为是对当时轰动整个学术界的不完全契约理论之争的终结者之声,同时也是关于该理论最经典的综述。

不完全契约理论之争由来已久,但随着人们对不完全契约本质的 深入揭示以及机制设计理论的迅速发展,许多学者研究得出,通过设计一些激励相容的机制,可以消除不完全契约的交易成本,从而可以在契约理论的框架内解决这一经典难题。1999年,著名的《经济研究评论》杂志在其66卷第一期以专辑形式掀起了不完全契约理论之争的高潮。以哈特和摩尔(Hart&Moore1999)为代表的产权理论学派认为,当不确定性下的自然状态足够复杂时,从本质上不存在一个可行的机制来实现帕累托有效的资源配置,因而只有通过合理地配置产权等制度安排来恢复资源配置的效率。这就是哈特-摩尔-西格尔(Hart-Moore-Segal1999)所证明的不可能定理

而以梯若尔和马斯金为代表的机制设计学派却对上述结论不以为然,他们在《不可预见的偶然性与不完全契约》论文中,运用机制设计理论的最新成果证明,不可预见的偶然性所造成的契约的不完全性,并不构成资源配置无效率的本质障碍,在当事人的效用函数不是非常限制性的情形下(即当事人没有很怪的偏好),我们可以设计出一个激励相容的机制,实现帕累托有效的配置。这就是马斯金-梯若尔Maskin-Tirole提出的可能定理

某些学者指责“Maskin-Tirole机制过于复杂因而无法在现实中应用,梯若尔则针锋相对地指出,所谓机制的复杂与否必须放到具体的应用范围中去讨论,如果机制的设计与实施的成本低于它所带来的收益,这种机制就是可行的。

事实上,在现实运用中,涉及到大规模项目的招标与拍卖机制往往设计得非常复杂,以至于只有少数专家才能掌握。另一方面,产权配置,作为一种强制性的制度安排,它所带来的交易成本往往非常高昂,并且容易被低估甚至忽略,而制度安排的锁定效应会导致长期交易的无效率。与此相比,机制,作为一种自持的契约安排,其交易成本显然要低得多。

创金融新论

2002年,梯若尔出版著作《金融危机、流动性与国际货币体制》,在国际金融学界引起巨大反响。以往针对金融危机的政策建议大都通过adhoc(缺乏微观基础)的模型推导而来,梯若尔认为这些建议只看到了问题的症状,而没有看到深层原因,资本自由化并不能医治百病。在该书中,梯若尔从最基本的假设出发,考虑了国际金融体系下贷款人和借款人的关系对流动性和风险的影响,强调了市场失灵对于国际金融危机的重要影响。

国际货币基金组织首席经济学家罗果夫(Kenneth Rogoff)教授说:这是第一本为国际金融问题提供了全面的严格的理论基础的著作,分析简洁,文字优雅,富有洞察力,它让我们重新审视国际金融机构的作用和缺点。

公司财务领域的研究在过去二十年有了长足的进展,但传统公司财务理论的缺陷一目了然:一方面,局限于对称信息框架下研究公司的财务结构对公司价值的影响,其代表性成果为莫迪里亚尼-米勒定理(简称MM定理),但MM定理所要求的条件过于理想化,使得 该理论在现实应用中受到很大限制,也无法解决公司财务领域出现的一些实际难题;另一方面,众多令人眼花缭乱的模型互相独立,不成体系,令人困惑。

2002年底,梯若尔出版了《公司财务理论》,在公司金融理论领域具有里程碑式的意义――第一部一统江湖之作。梯若尔令人耳目一新、驾轻就熟地给一个原本支离破碎和复杂得令人沮丧的领域带来了无可置疑的统一和简约之美。他以公司金融和契约理论的联系统一全书,在不对称信息框架下重新改写了公司财务理论,运用对策论、激励理论、产业组织理论的方法,重点讨论了公司治理结构、控制权分配、流动性管理、监管与收购等问题,给公司财务理论界定了更广阔的研究范围和新的研究重点与方向。

 

主要著作

梯若尔20多年学术生涯中发表300多篇高水平论文,11部专著,仅让·梯若尔2005年在顶级杂志上发表的论文数目比欧洲其他所有的学校加起来还多。

1982年和1985年在最权威的Econometrica(经济计量学杂志)发表了两篇经典论文:《理性预期下投机行为的可能性》和《资产泡沫和世代交叠模型》,这两篇论文奠定了他在该领域的权威地位。

1986年发表在《法、经济学与组织杂志》上的基本框架——多代理人模型上,它指出了研究串谋问题的重要性并提供了基本方法论。

1988年,他的代表作之一《产业组织理论》出版,标志着产业经济学新的理论框架的完成。在此后的十几年中,这本书一直作为世界著名大学经济系研究生的权威教程而广为流传,至今无人超越。

1991年,梯若尔与弗登伯格(Drew Fudenberg)合著《博弈论》出版。该书以其关于博弈论体系和发展方向的把握,立刻成为博弈论领域最权威的高级教程,对世界著名大学研究生的博弈论教育产生了重要影响。

1992年,在国际经济计量学会第六届世界大会上,梯若尔提交论文《经济组织中的串谋问题》。因而如何在制度设计中解决串谋问题,一直成为政治家和学者们不懈努力的目标之一,并在人类的制度文化中占有重要地位。

1993年梯若尔和拉丰出版的著作《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》完成了新规制经济学理论框架的构建,并奠定了他们在这一领域的学术领导者地位。

1991-1998年,梯若尔确立了在经济学领域中的领导地位。在这一时期,梯若尔先后发表了《对策论》(合著)、《经济组织中的串谋问题》、《不完全契约理论》等经典论文。

1999年,梯若尔在Econometrica发表了《不完全契约理论:我们究竟该站在什么立场上》。这篇论文被认为是对当时轰动整个学术界的不完全契约理论之争的终结者之声,同时也是关于该理论最经典的综述。

2000年,作为对十几年垄断行业规制理论与政策研究的总结,他和拉丰合著的《电信竞争》一书,为电信及网络产业的竞争与规制问题的分析和政策的制订提供了一个最为权威的理论依据。

2002年,梯若尔出版著作《金融危机、流动性与国际货币体制》,在国际金融学界引起巨大反响。

2002年底,梯若尔出版了《公司财务理论》,在公司金融理论领域具有里程碑式的意义。(完)


     
文章来源:诺贝尔官网、搜狐财经、互动百科(本文仅代表作者观点)

 

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